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Abstract
Over the past year, two major policy initiatives have been introduced focusing on stimulating antibiotic development
for human consumption. The European Investment Bank has announced the development of the Infectious Disease
Financing Facility (IDFF) and the British government commissioned the Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, led by
Jim O’Neill. Each constitutes a major effort by the European community to address the evolving crisis of antimicrobial
resistance. Though both have similar goals, the approaches are unique and worthy of consideration.
This manuscript utilizes a previously published framework for evaluation of antibiotic incentive plans to clearly identify
the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal. The merits of each proposal are evaluated in how they satisfy four key
objectives: 1) Improve the overall net present value (NPV) for new antibiotic projects; 2) Enable greater participation of
Small to Medium Sized Enterprises (SME); 3) Encourage participation by large pharmaceutical companies; 4) Facilitate
cooperation and synergy across the antibiotic market. The IDFF seeks to make forgivable loans to corporations with
promising compounds, while the O’Neill group proposes a more comprehensive framework of early stage funding,
along with the creation of a stable global market.
Ultimately, the proposals may prove complementary and if implemented together may form a more comprehensive
plan to address an impending global crisis. Substantial progress will only be made on these efforts if action is taken at
an international level, therefore we recommend consideration of these efforts at the upcoming G20 summit.
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Background
The prospect of a world without effective antibiotics is
a daunting one. Some estimates suggest that deaths at-
tributable to antimicrobial resistance may rise from the
current estimate of 700,000 lives per year to ten million
lives annually by 2050, at a cost to world GDP of
US$100 trillion [1]. At the same time, almost 50 incentive
strategies have been proposed to stimulate antibiotic
development [2]. These include push, pull and hybrid
mechanisms (combination of push and pull mechanisms),
among many others, all with the ultimate goal of increasing
the number of effective antibiotics for human consumption.
The two most recent large scale efforts in this area are in
the final stages of planning.
The first of these efforts, the Infectious Disease Fi-
nance Facility, is a funding mechanism proposed by the
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European
Commission (EC) [3]. The second is an outline published
by the Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, chaired by Jim
O’Neill, which seeks to identify the characteristics of an
optimal incentive strategy to promote private development
of more antimicrobial compounds [4]. The O’Neill Review
proposal is more comprehensive in its scope, but lacks a
defined mechanism to implement its ideals. The EIB/EC
financing facility outlines definitive steps, but is narrower
in scope. Both potentially offer valuable contributions to-
wards addressing the current crisis, however, each of these
mechanisms utilizes slightly different strategies, and like
any incentive plan, they are influenced largely by their
country of origin, local politics, and specific agendas of the
designers. Therefore, a framework is necessary to critically
evaluate newly proposed strategies. We have recently
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described such a framework for evaluation of incentive
mechanisms [5], and in this paper seek to apply this
framework to the above initiatives.
The Infectious Disease Finance Facility (IDFF) was re-
cently announced as a joint venture by the EC and EIB
[3]. This facility will utilize risk sharing loans that will
only require repayment if they result in a marketable
product. If successful antibiotics pay money back into
the fund, this will increase the overall size of the fund
and allow further rounds of funding. The EC and EIB
predict at least a 5x multiplier effect due to the require-
ment that grant recipients or other donors match at
least half of the required funds for the project. While the
exact terms of such loans have yet to be determined,
each project applying for funding must have completed
pre-clinical testing.
The Review on Antimicrobial Resistance chaired by
Jim O’Neill, has written a preliminary report of their rec-
ommendations to spur antibiotic investment and devel-
opment. Hereafter referred to as the O’Neill report, this
documents asserts the need for development of two to
four compounds with novel therapeutic profiles every
decade in order to keep up with antibiotic resistance.
The report specifically outlines three sets of necessary
interventions:
1) Creation of a more predictable market for antibiotics
to sustain commercial investment in R&D
2) Focused funding in early stage research (through a
global AMR innovation research fund)
3) Innovations to promote efficient drug development
The O’Neill report notes the potential for early payment
after development, or even during the development
process, potentially as milestone payments or product
development partnerships. While initially proposing a
potential global buyer, the report recognizes the limited
practicality of this scenario and instead advocates a hybrid
model, including a lump sum payment as well as the op-
tion for companies to sell the developed drug for a profit.
Early reports suggest that the group will advocate for
US$2 billion to be allocated for push incentives, to fund
projects in development through grants. Simultaneously,
they would also allocate somewhere between US$16–37
billion for prize mechanisms [4]. The exact amount of
each prize could vary depending on whether or not the
purchaser will buy out the entire market for the pharma-
ceutical or just a portion of the market.
Methods
While both of the above proposals have obvious merit, a
closer analysis is warranted, and can be performed utiliz-
ing our previously proposed framework. This framework
examines the requisite market criteria for a new incentive,
as well as public health objectives and implementation
feasibility.
Market criteria
It is well recognized that the market fails for antibiotics, for
a variety of reasons [6]. Therefore, an effective incentive
strategy must correct these failures, in part by addressing
four key criteria:
1. Improve the overall net present value (NPV) for new
antibiotic projects
2. Enable greater participation of Small to Medium
Sized Enterprises (SME)
3. Encourage participation by large pharmaceutical
companies
4. Facilitate cooperation and synergy across the
antibiotic market
Improve overall Net Present Value (NPV)
Potential compounds are evaluated based on their ultimate
costs and revenues, as well as the likelihood of achieving
returns. Returns are also discounted by the time cost of
money, or the cost of the capital needed to fund the project.
This complex calculation results in a net present value
assigned to each project. Projects with high net present
values – ideally demonstrating a high likelihood of return-
ing significant profits – are likely to be pursued. Low or
negative net present values (NPV) suggest that the costs
are too high or the probability of achieving significant
returns is too low.
Antibiotics generally suffer from low NPVs. One esti-
mate puts the average NPV for antibiotics at US$-50
million, compared to US$1.15 billion for musculoskeletal
drugs [7]. Therefore any mechanism that increases the
NPV can incentivize antibiotic development. This can be
done by improving the likelihood of approval, increasing
profits or decreasing the costs. The likelihood of ap-
proval is a regulatory and safety issue, and strategies
for this will be discussed later. Increasing profits could
be accomplished by a lump sum payment mechanism,
but any lump sum payment at the time of approval
would be heavily discounted by the cost of capital over
the time span needed to bring a drug to market, and
by the overall low likelihood of achieving marketing
approval. Put simply, uncertain money in the distant
future would need to be promised in very large amounts
to encourage concrete action and investment now. An
alternative would be to lower costs, in part by subsidiz-
ing research. Mechanisms like this, termed push mech-
anisms, are not new, but they generally are not tied to
an identifiable outcome and are sometimes criticized
for lack of efficacy.
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Enable greater participation of small to medium sized
enterprises
Munos [8] found that the discovery of new molecular
entities (NME) has remained relatively constant over the
past 60 years, and suggests a correlation between the
number of NME’s and the number of participating drug
companies. He argues that a larger number of compan-
ies involved in research may speed up the acquisition of
knowledge and lead to greater development. Small com-
panies may not have the necessary funds to transition
investigational compounds into clinical trials. Therefore,
participation of these companies may be enhanced with
a variety of mechanisms. Early stage funding could help
bring their ideas to fruition, or at least allow them to
collect more data to secure further funding from investors.
Open source data sharing, utilization of public-private part-
nerships, patent buyouts and assistance with regulatory
hurdles or global coordination of clinical trials are all
mechanisms to help leverage the limited resources of
smaller enterprises [2, 9]. An effective incentive will seek
to include a mechanism to accomplish this.
Encourage participation by large pharmaceutical
companies
The overall cost of development by a large pharmaceut-
ical firm may be greater than $5 billion on average for
each drug that makes it to market, and there is some
evidence to suggest that this average is higher for larger
pharmaceutical firms than smaller ones [10]. This is
likely due to the fact that when smaller companies fail,
they usually go bankrupt, while larger companies must
carry the cost of the failure on their balance sheet. Still,
it underscores the need for larger companies to allocate
resources wisely and lessen their financial risks when
pursuing projects with potentially limited payouts.
Facilitate cooperation and synergy across the antibiotic
market
Success in antibiotic development largely aligns with
public health goals, as discussed further below. Despite
the financial risks involved, great potential exists for syner-
gistic cooperation in development, regulation, distribution
and monitoring. An ideal incentive mechanism would
encourage cooperation among the various stakeholders,
including local and national governments, international
health organizations, industry leaders, as well as regulatory
and medical personnel.
Public health objectives (access and stewardship)
The optimal incentive will not only encourage participa-
tion and development of compounds via the four domains
listed above, it will also seek to influence distribution and
utilization of this unique resource. The efficacy of antibi-
otics is directly related to their utilization, so profligate
prescribing may render them relatively impotent due to
the emergence of resistant bacteria. High prices can
restrict use, but also hinder appropriate access by those
with less means. A delicate balance must be struck be-
tween judicious prescribing and ease of access regardless
of income.
Implementation feasibility
Multiple barriers will exist to implementation of any
incentive scheme. Complex schemes may prove too
wieldy or expensive, regulatory barriers may be too high,
or trade agreements too rigid. Therefore the ease of im-
plementation of any proposed incentive must also be
considered in the final tally.
Results
Having outlined a set of criteria by which to judge any
proposed solution to stimulate antibiotic innovation, we
may now critically compare the IDFF and O’Neill reports.
Market criteria
The IDFF proposal would help to improve the NPV of a
potential project by investing in the compound prior to
market approval, likely in the clinical phase. Loan recipi-
ents must fund at least 25 % of the project costs, while
the IDFF may fund up to half of the costs, with the re-
mainder paid by third parties. Any funding during the
development phase will improve the overall NPV, but
funding in the later clinical stages will have a relatively
smaller effect on the overall NPV calculation at the initi-
ation of the project, given the time value of money.
Therefore, the timing of investment in the IDFF pro-
posal is a comparative weakness. So too is the overall
amount of funding currently proposed. Initial estimates
suggest that up to €300 million may be spread across a
total of 9–12 projects. Development costs of new drugs
have been projected to be as high as US$2.5 billion [11],
although this number is somewhat debated and may
vary depending on the exact accounting methods used
[12]. Regardless, even if the true cost is half this, €300
million spread over ten projects may not be a sufficient
investment. If the EIB assumes additional risk, the fund
anticipates doubling the expected 5× multiplier to return
up to a 10X multiplier from repayments, returns and
co-investments, but it is unclear as to how this will be
achieved.
In contrast, the O’Neill report advocates between
US$18–35 billion in overall investment, a sum that
dwarfs that proposed by the IDFF. Specifically, the in-
vestment could come in one of two phases: 1) early stage
investment to support innovative, but riskier projects or
2) late stage lump sum payments at the time of, or within
1–3 years of, market approval. The lump sum payment
would be designed to provide a sufficient market for the
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antibiotic to help ensure a de-linkage between the volume
sold and the financial returns to the company. The exact
mechanism by which this would be accomplished has not
been determined, but could manifest as a global purchaser
who would control the entire market for a designated anti-
biotic, or as a one off payment, with allowances for the
company to continue to market the antibiotic. The advan-
tage of this system is that the combination of early stage
investment and late stage bulk purchasing can profoundly
improve the NPV for a designated compound. The cre-
ation of an artificial market for the antibiotic could prove
rather potent. Early stage investment will also provide
more “bang for the buck”, and potentially decrease the
sum needed at the time of market approval. Therefore, the
O’Neill report recommendations will likely prove more
effective in improving NPV for a potential project.
Small to medium sized enterprise vs large pharmaceutical
participation
The IDFF proposal anticipates allocating money to small
and medium sized enterprises, approximately €25 million
to each of 8–10 companies. These companies would be
expected to fund up to 25 % of the project, with a
maximum of 50 % of funds coming from IDFF money.
The remaining funds could then be contributed by a
third party. This could prove sufficient to allow initial
testing of products. However, recent data suggests that
pre-clinical testing costs on average may be as high as
US$1.1 billion [11]. Therefore, the funding from IDFF
would likely not be sufficient to fund development through
pre-clinical testing – substantial additional support would
be required. The IDFF report also suggests that the project
should have completed pre-clinical testing, thus €25 million
could only be applied to clinical testing.
The O’Neill proposal encourages SME participation
through two separate mechanisms. The first is the cre-
ation of a global innovation fund to help support early
stage research, this could specifically target neglected
areas of research and encourage innovative thinking.
The proposal suggests a sum of US$2 billion spread over
5 years. SME’s and large pharmaceutical firms alike
could participate if their research was considered worthy
of investment. The report suggests that the existence of
the fund for 5 years would be sufficient to reinvigorate
R&D spending for an additional 10–15 years. They also
suggest that the fund should be paid for by contributions
from the global pharmaceutical industry.
Secondly, the proposal advocates for more centralized
platforms for clinical trials, as well as efforts to increase
information sharing during early development to lessen
the regulatory burden. This is a critical step to decreas-
ing overall costs as DiMasi found that clinical approval
success rates have decreased over the past decade while
costs of clinical trials have increased [11]. Specifically,
clinical R&D costs rose from US$608 million in the
1990’s to US$1.46 billion in the following decade. Both
large and small pharmaceutical firms would benefit from
decreased regulatory burden if it led to lower clinical
trial costs with higher success rates. Smaller enterprises
may be more prone to share early stage development or
clinical data to cut overall costs. It is unclear however if
larger corporations would be willing to do this as well.
Larger corporations will likely focus more on the over-
all long term profit of the compound, as their resources
will allow them to spend a significant amount on early
development and clinical trials if profitability is relatively
assured. Smaller firms do not have this luxury, and re-
quire more help at earlier stages, but do not require as
much profitability in the longer term. Large corporations
need profits of US$800 million per compound to make a
project viable, while smaller firms may need as little as
US$100–200 million [13]. The IDFF addresses this dis-
crepancy in the funding needs of large and small firms
by allowing loans of up to US$75 million to one or two
large pharmaceutical firms. The O’Neill group advocates
for harnessing market forces to attract participation of
large firms by creating large prizes, effectively assuring a
market for the antibiotic, through the use of a global
purchaser. This mechanism would favor participation by
larger firms as opposed to smaller ones, as large firms
have access to capital that would allow them to fund
costly clinical trials as long as a profitable market can be
guaranteed upon approval.
Facilitate synergy
The current information available regarding the IDFF pro-
posal does not address the concept of synergy among many
stakeholders, other than to require a proportion of the
funding to come from outside donors. There is no mechan-
ism to increase collaboration among developers or affect
change in regulatory structure. In contrast, the O’Neill re-
port advocates for harmonization of the regulatory approval
process across countries to minimize duplication, time re-
quirements and cost of regulatory filings. A global approval
process could help improve access to antibiotics and de-
crease the overall cost to the developer. Similarly, involve-
ment of national agencies in facilitating clinical trials for
antibiotics could reduce costs and speed up the approval
process, as discussed in the O’Neill report.
Public health objectives
Any effort to increase the antibiotic pipeline will align
with global public health objectives, however regional
priorities may differ. The IDFF requires that recipients
of such grants be established or operating in member
states, and that projects “must have proven public health
impact and potentially market impact”. The program is
aimed at vaccines, drugs and medical devices in the field
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of infectious diseases. It does not explicitly state that the
public health needs must address those of the member
states, however it is unclear if funders would be willing
to pay for projects addressing regional objectives outside
of the member states.
The O’Neill proposal is more broad in its scope. It
seeks to establish a global market for pharmaceuticals
meeting pre-determined needs. There is no restriction
on the location of participating entities or their intended
targets. Their contention is that a single public purchaser
will be more suited to effectively address global needs and
respond to changing priorities. This system would also
help to limit over-production and over-prescribing of anti-
biotics if the supply was controlled by a single global
buyer. However, this also has the potential to restrict
access to the pharmaceutical, whether appropriate or not.
Implementation feasibility
Implementation of any strategy will ultimately depend
on obtaining sufficient funding. A risk sharing loan scheme
such as that proposed by the IDFF would be relatively
straight forward to implement and only require a com-
mittee to evaluate potential projects, as well as a suffi-
ciently large amount of capital. Choosing successful
projects will be more challenging, as there is always
some asymmetry of information between applicants
and funders. Still, from a practical standpoint, such a
mechanism would be simple to implement.
The structure of the O’Neill proposal is a bit more
complicated. The “blue sky” innovation fund would need
a structure similar to that proposed by the IDFF, a com-
mittee of qualified personnel to decide on which projects
to invest in. Creation of a global buyer would require a
similar committee as well as a significant source of fund-
ing. Once the antibiotic has been purchased, it would
then need to be appropriately distributed/allocated to
member states. Mechanisms would need to be created to
identify appropriate use and prevent waste/over-prescrib-
ing, as market forces would likely not be effective. Similarly,
harmonization of global regulatory requirements would re-
quire a significant political effort to coordinate disparate
agencies across more than a hundred countries. Sharing
of research ideas and technical expertise could be accom-
plished quite easily through an electronic repository, but
intellectual property concerns and protection could make
this difficult to practically implement. Therefore, the
complexity and scope that makes the O’Neill report
comprehensive also makes it significantly more challenging
to implement.
Discussion
While we commend the IDFF proposal for its attempt to
enhance early financing, it lacks a comprehensive strat-
egy for stimulation of antibiotic development and relies
in large part on the co-funding of projects by third par-
ties to supplement IDFF funds. The proposal appears to
require this funding and loan repayments to generate
the 5-10x multiplier effect. The validity of this approach
is unclear, particularly if it is dependent on repayments
from projects that are generally considered to be non-
viable from a commercial standpoint. Essentially, this fi-
nancing facility provides cheap money to pharmaceutical
corporations in an effort to lower their cost of capital
and promote investment in research and development.
Unfortunately, the mechanism has no clawback provision
to regain additional funds or discount the costs of the
drugs if they are profitable. At best, the facility recoups the
cost of the loan; at worst, the loan becomes a grant to the
failed enterprise. This structure’s effects on the sustainabil-
ity of the financing facility and on its ability to promote
true innovation are unclear. The IDFF is demand driven,
in that it funds proposals put forth by industry, with no
clear agenda of its own, other than a generalized mandate.
Without a clear framework to identify and set priorities,
there is a risk that the facility will fund priorities of corpo-
rations instead of public health objectives. The European
Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) provides a caution-
ary tale of how corporate incentives may diverge from
public goals. The IMI is a jointly funded initiative by the
European Union and the European pharmaceutical indus-
try. The most recent program, funded in 2014, has a
budget of €3.276 billion [14], with almost half of this com-
ing from in-kind contributions from the pharmaceutical
industry. While the focus of the program is to provide
early stage development funding for a variety of medicines,
including antibiotics, it has come under criticism recently
for lack of transparency and diversion of resources to pro-
jects felt to be lucrative by the industry, but not aligned
with major European public health objectives [15, 16].
The IMI is not without its merits, and a complete
discussion of this initiative is beyond the scope of this
article. It does serve a useful mechanism as early stage
funding for development of compounds, much the same
way that the IDFF proposal could fund products in clinical
testing. While these initiatives (IMI and IDFF) have the
potential to be complementary, no framework exists to
facilitate this, leaving an overall disjointed response to
funding innovation.
Regardless of the mechanism employed, giving away
cheap money to corporations is the low hanging fruit in
spurring development: it is simple and relatively easy to
implement and monitor. These payments are crucial to
the overall success of any plan, as incentives will be most
effective when companies are partially shielded from
losses with lump sum payments, but still have potential
for market gains if the product proves to be profitable.
Therefore, the crucial question is the timing of the lump
sum payment. The simplest method would involve a large
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payment at the time of market approval, providing a re-
ward for successful development, or a large purchase to
help control global market share. While the prospect of
making large payments at the time of market approval is
attractive because it allows the buyer to know exactly what
they are purchasing, and thus fulfills the goal of good
stewardship of public funds, it is short sighted and flawed,
for the reasons previously discussed.
Regardless of the timing of a potential payment, in-
vestments at any stage should come with accountability.
Conditions should be given to any developer receiving
funding from the O’Neill report’s push mechanism. This
will likely be less palatable to large pharmaceutical cor-
porations, but better tolerated by small to medium sized
enterprises who may otherwise lack the capital needed
to bring a novel drug to market. Zero risk loans are
highly desired by the pharmaceutical industry, and given
their political clout, we fear that this may sway policy
makers to structure push mechanisms as forgivable
loans (as is proposed by the IDFF). This would not be a
judicious use of public funds.
We have previously proposed an alternative model, the
options market for antibiotics [17, 18], which is a hybrid
of early incentive payments combined with payments
at the time of approval, similar to the hybrid model
described by the O’Neill report. This model calls for a
single payment or series of payments at any stage of
development, in exchange for the promise of discounts
to purchasers if and when the drug makes it to market. It
is modeled on a financial call option, which allows inves-
tors to speculate on the chances of a stock rising or falling.
The early payout helps to defray development costs,
stimulating research and development by small and large
companies alike. The discount at the time of market
approval helps the payer efficiently purchase the new
compound. Even more importantly, the early payout
will allow funders to get more “bang for the buck”, as
early stage investments need not be as large to have the
same impact as late stage funding. Other hybrid models
have been developed in recent years with similar com-
ponents. The Project BioShield Act in the US provided
a guaranteed government market for medical counter-
measures to treat biological threats, as well as federal
funding to stimulate research [19]. The World Health
Organization Global Consortium model utilizes milestone
prizes, research grants, open source data sharing and
advance purchase agreements to stimulate neglected
antimicrobial development [20]. These two examples
demonstrate that a unified solution must have provisions
to stimulate and reward early development, as well as
provide a viable market after approval has been granted.
Of course, the key to any of these proposals is a large
financing facility that has the resources and freedom to
invest in potentially uncertain projects. The O’Neill
Review advocates an innovation fund to support “blue
sky” scientific research. We agree that this is crucial, yet
it need not be separate from the goal of creating a predict-
able market. Push and pull mechanisms can be combined,
but a credible payer must be able to commit early, as well
as demonstrate a capacity to reward innovators at late
stages. This requires money, and expertise in judging
promising projects. A fund such as that proposed by the
IDFF may prove well suited to just such a task.
Overall, the aims of the IDFF proposal are noble, but
incomplete on their own. The O’Neill report goes further
with recommendations regarding more comprehensive
policy reform to address market imperfections. Neither
goes far enough in demanding some type of tradeoff from
manufacturers should the drug be successful (beyond re-
quiring loan repayment). Investment is risky, and it is not
unreasonable to expect investors (even public ones) to be
compensated for this risk in the form of lower prices or
clawback provisions. This could ensure the continued
feasibility of such a fund, particularly if the clawback pay-
ments went towards further funding. However, such an
idea will likely be unpopular and politically difficult to
pass. Developers may argue that such a provision will hurt
innovation, however it is an axiom of modern finance that
risk can be calculated, and appropriately compensated for.
Given the political sensitivity of such an issue, this
demands further attention from a global body, such as
the G20. Any single national government could be easily
coerced by the pharmaceutical lobby. However, when
dealing with a problem of international market failures, an
international solution is necessary. Therefore we strongly
urge the G20 to consider the above proposals as a frame-
work to begin drafting a unified solution to the impending
threat of antimicrobial resistance at their next summit. A
model for this may be found in the efforts of the European
Union’s Joint Programming Initiative on Antimicrobial Re-
sistance (JPIAMR), which works to coordinate the efforts
of EU funded research projects on antimicrobial resistance
[21]. A G20 version of this body may prove to be perfectly
suited to coordinate global programs on the issue.
Conclusions
Ultimately, the success or failure of any effort to stem
the tide of antimicrobial resistance and develop new an-
tibiotics will hinge on the ability to coordinate a global
effort. Large global funders may have the market share
and regulatory powers to both incentivize development
and control reckless distribution. We believe a hybrid
model of early payments, a strong commitment by cred-
ible purchasers, and the ability to sell on the open mar-
ket at the time of drug approval are crucial, but above
all, a unified global response is essential. The last three
months have shown two commendable efforts arise in
Europe, but even these are currently disjointed in their
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implementation. Well-intentioned, elegant strategies ex-
ecuted in a disorganized fashion will do little to confront
the impending crisis. The global health community will
be better served by coordinating efforts between the IDFF
as a financing mechanism and the comprehensive guid-
ance of the O’Neill report.
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